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	<title>Verified Voting Blog</title>
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	<link>http://blog.verifiedvoting.org</link>
	<description>promoting transparent and verifiable elections</description>
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		<title>UK Guardian: Oscars vote vulnerable to cyber-attack under new online system, experts warn</title>
		<link>http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/2012/02/02/1506</link>
		<comments>http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/2012/02/02/1506#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 02 Feb 2012 19:35:16 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Verified Voting</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Internet Voting]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/?p=1506</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Computer security experts have warned that the 2013 Oscars ballot may be vulnerable to a variety of cyber attacks that could falsify the outcome but remain undetected, if the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences follows through on its decision to switch to internet voting for its members. The Academy announced last week that it would be ditching its current vote-by-mail system and allowing its members to fill out electronic ballots from their home or office computers to make their choices for best picture and the other big Hollywood prizes, starting in 2013. It announced a partnership with Everyone Counts, a California-based company which has developed software for internet elections from Australia to Florida, and boasted it would incorporate "multiple layers of security" and "military-grade encryption techniques" to maintain its reputation for scrupulous honesty in respecting its members' voting preferences.

The change will be a culture shock for an Academy voting community that tends to skew older and more conservative: indeed, concerns are already surfacing whether all of the Academy voters even have email addresses. And the claims have been met with deep scepticism by a computer scientist community which has grappled for years with the problem of making online elections fully verifiable while maintaining ballot secrecy – in other words, being rigorous about auditing the voting process but still making sure nobody knows who voted for what. So far, nobody has demonstrated that such a thing is possible.

"Everybody would like there to be secure internet voting, but some very smart people have looked at the problem and can't figure out how to do it," said David Dill, a professor of computer science at Stanford University and founder of the election transparency group Verified Voting. "The problem arises as soon as you decouple the voter from the recorded vote. If someone casts a ballot for best actor A and the vote is recorded for best actor B, the voter has no way of knowing the ballot has been altered, and the auditor won't be able to see it either."]]></description>
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		<item>
		<title>Duncan Buell: Patriocracy Overlooks Internet Voting Security Concerns</title>
		<link>http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/2012/01/20/1499</link>
		<comments>http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/2012/01/20/1499#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 20 Jan 2012 16:22:01 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Verified Voting</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Internet Voting]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/?p=1499</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The League of Women Voters of South Carolina recently screened "Patriocracy," a new film by Brian Malone, who attended the screening and participated in a question and answer event afterward. The film focuses on the question of whether the US political system is broken because politics have become too partisan and the unwillingness of polarized groups to compromise. My primary motivation in writing this review stems from roughly 60-second segment of the 60-minute film that featured Americans Elect COO Elliot Ackerman making the familiar and discredited argument that if we can bank and shop online we can vote online.

If one were doing a film about cures for cancer, and time were given to someone explaining theories of the arrangement of crystals around the patient, the science would be called into question. If one were doing a film about nuclear energy and time were given to someone explaining that the answer lay in extending the half life of uranium by a factor of four to six, the science would be called into question. If one were doing a film about the possible evils of the Citizens United decision of SCOTUS, and time were given to someone discussing how to have the House of Representatives solve the problem by passing a law, then the legal judgement would be called into question, and the judgement of the filmmaker would be called into question in permitting a bogus argument like that to be included in what was purported to be a legitimate film.]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
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		<item>
		<title>Ballot Secrecy Keeps Voting Technology at Bay &#124; Scientific American</title>
		<link>http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/2012/01/09/1492</link>
		<comments>http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/2012/01/09/1492#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 10 Jan 2012 01:23:44 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Verified Voting</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Voting Techology]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/?p=1492</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Republicans during Tuesday's New Hampshire primary will use a technology recognizable to Washington and Lincoln to make their choices

Posted at Scientific American: Voters in the recent Iowa caucuses and Tuesday's New Hampshire primary will rely on paper ballots as they have for generations. In the very next primary on January 21, South Carolinians will vote with backlit touch-screen computers.

In an age of electronic banking and online college degrees, why hasn't the rest of the nation gone the way of the Palmetto State? The reason is simple and resonates with the contentious debate that has yet to be resolved after at least 15 years of wrangling over the issue of electronic voting. No one has yet figured out a straightforward method of ensuring that one of the most revered democratic institutions—in this case, electing a U.S. president—can be double checked for fraud, particularly when paperless e-voting systems are used.

Voters can cast their ballot in a variety of ways, depending upon the method adopted by their election district. This includes paper ballots, punch cards, two different types of touch-screen electronic voting system (one that prints out a receipt verifying your vote and one that does not), optical scanners used to digitize paper ballots, or some combination of these.

New Hampshire, like nearly two-thirds of the country, has a paper ballot system that voters mark up and turn in to election officials who count the ballots either by electrical scanners or by hand. With the optical-scan approach, if the ballot is not filled out properly or is unreadable, the scanner will not accept the vote and the voter can fix his or her ballot before leaving the polling place, Dill says.]]></description>
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		<item>
		<title>Roadmap for Future California Elections</title>
		<link>http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/2011/12/30/1473</link>
		<comments>http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/2011/12/30/1473#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 30 Dec 2011 18:54:41 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Verified Voting</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[State]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/?p=1473</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[When it comes to elections, what does California do well? What could California do better? How have we led, and how have we perhaps lagged behind? These are questions that a diverse group of individuals and organizations asked themselves and one another over the course of three months, with an aim to envision the future of California's elections.

Download the Roadmap for Future California Elections (pdf)

It turned out to be an extraordinary conversation and a process which could very well serve as a model for other states as well.  One driving force in the process was the convening organization, the James Irvine Foundation, which has long worked on issues of importance to Californians. The participants included a diverse range of representatives with a concern for voters and not-yet voters, for elections and how they function, and for California's democracy.]]></description>
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		<item>
		<title>Dismissed Venango County Pennsylvania Election Board Files Appeal &#124; VotePA</title>
		<link>http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/2011/12/02/1469</link>
		<comments>http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/2011/12/02/1469#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 02 Dec 2011 22:27:44 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Verified Voting</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Voting Techology]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/?p=1469</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Attorney Charles A. Pascal, Jr., has filed a Motion For Reconsideration on behalf of members of the specially appointed Venango County Election Board. The filing was made this afternoon in response to President Judge Oliver J. Lobaugh's order dismissing the Board yesterday. Citing ongoing investigations into serious voting machine problems reported during the May 17 primary election, the specially appointed Election Board requested that they be allowed to continue their work until 11:59 PM on December 31, 2011.

"The members of the specially appointed Board of Elections believes that it is necessary to continue their work in order to assure the voters of the County of Venango of the integrity of the election process in the county," the Motion states, "and to assure that any possible violations of policy, protocol, best practices, or the law, or any directive of the Pennsylvania Secretary of State, are not repeated in future elections."]]></description>
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		<item>
		<title>If I can shop and bank online, why can’t I vote online?</title>
		<link>http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/2011/11/02/1460</link>
		<comments>http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/2011/11/02/1460#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 02 Nov 2011 07:36:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Verified Voting</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Internet Voting]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/?p=1460</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[There is widespread pressure around the country today for the introduction of some form of Internet voting in public elections that would allow people to vote online, all electronically, from their own personal computers or mobile devices. Proponents argue that Internet voting would offer greater speed and convenience, particularly for overseas and military voters and, in fact, any voters allowed to vote that way.

However, computer and network security experts are virtually unanimous in pointing out that online voting is an exceedingly dangerous threat to the integrity of U.S. elections. There is no way with current technology to guarantee that the security, privacy, and transparency requirements for elections can all be met with any security technology in the foreseeable future. Anyone from a disaffected misfit individual to a national intelligence agency can remotely attack an online election, modifying or filtering ballots in ways that are undetectable and uncorrectable of just disrupting the election and creating havoc. There are a host of such attacks that can be used singly or in combination. In the cyber security world today almost all of the advantages are with attackers, and any of these attacks can result in the wrong persons being elected, or initiatives wrongly passed or rejected.

Nonetheless, the proponents point to the fact that millions of people regularly bank and shop online every day without apparent problems,. They note that an online voting transaction resembles an ecommerce transaction, at least superficially. You connect your browser to the appropriate site, authenticate yourself, make your choices with the mouse, click on a final confirmation button, and you are done! All of the potential attacks alluded above apply equally to shopping and banking services, so what is the difference? People ask, quite naturally, “If it is safe to do my banking and shopping online, why can’t I vote online?”

This is a very fair question, and it deserves a careful, thorough answer because the reasons are not obvious. Unfortunately it requires substantial development to explain fully. But in brief, our answer is in two-parts:

1. It is not actually “safe” to conduct ecommerce transactions online. It is in fact very risky, more so every day, and essentially all those risks apply equally to online voting transactions.

2. The technical security, privacy, and transparency requirements for voting are structurally different from, and much more stringent than, those for ecommerce transactions. Even if ecommerce transactions were safe, the security technology underpinning them would not suffice for voting. In particular, the security and privacy requirements for voting are unique and in tension in a way that has no analog in the ecommerce world.]]></description>
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		<title>How Voting Equipment Varies in the U.S.</title>
		<link>http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/2011/10/25/1457</link>
		<comments>http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/2011/10/25/1457#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 25 Oct 2011 12:04:58 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Verified Voting</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Voting Techology]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/?p=1457</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The following article was posted at Digital Communities on October 24 2011.

Pamela Smith and the Verified Voting Foundation (VVF) are on a mission — in her words — "to safeguard elections in the digital age." In an earlier time, she said, ballot boxes were inspected the morning before voting began then were padlocked. Voters would insert their paper ballots, and when the polls closed, officials would unlock the boxes and count the ballots. Smith, the foundation’s president, isn't advocating a return to those simpler days, but she says that some modern electronic voting systems present unique challenges that make democracy vulnerable to tampering.

With some systems, said Smith, the voter marks a paper ballot, which then goes through an electronic scanner for tallying the vote. With that kind of system, she said, there's a hard-copy record of the vote that can be used to audit accuracy, or in the event of a recount. The foundation's map of "America's Voting Systems in 2010" show a broad range of systems, from Oregon's vote-by-mail to South Carolina's "DRE without VVPAT," which signifies a direct recording electronic voting machine that has no voter-verified paper audit trail.]]></description>
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		<item>
		<title>MIT to host Cal/Tech Voting Technology Project Seminar  Election Integrity: Past, Present, and Future</title>
		<link>http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/2011/09/26/1452</link>
		<comments>http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/2011/09/26/1452#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 27 Sep 2011 00:00:11 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Verified Voting</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[National]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/?p=1452</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Hosted by the Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, a seminar entitled "Election Integrity: Past, Present, and Future" will commemorate the 25th anniversary of the First National Symposium on Security and Reliability of Computers in the Electoral Process, held in Boston in 1986.    The panelists will look back at the issues that first aroused concerns about the use of computers in public elections a quarter of a century ago, then assess the current situation and future directions for enhancing election integrity. The goal is also to continue dialogues among all stakeholders in the election process, including election administrators, technical professionals, academics, citizens, and vendors. There will be a Q&#038;A period following each panel.

From the MIT website:

A renewed focus on voting technologies and election administration erupted following the 2000 presidential election and the recount controversy in Florida. Since 2000, the focus of analysis has expanded to consider other vital aspects of U.S. public elections, including transparency and the public verification of election results.]]></description>
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		<item>
		<title>Report on the Estonian Internet Voting System</title>
		<link>http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/2011/09/03/1435</link>
		<comments>http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/2011/09/03/1435#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sat, 03 Sep 2011 16:55:34 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Verified Voting</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Internet Voting]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/?p=1435</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I visited Estonia in mid-July of this year at the invitation of Edgar Savisaar, the country's first prime minister and current mayor of Tallinn. Mr. Savisaar is the leader of the Centre Party, which placed second in recent national elections. The Centre Party and Mr. Savisaar have been questioning the outcome of the Internet voting portion of those elections. They invited me to Estonia because of a presentation I made at a European Parliament panel on the risks of Internet voting.

I told my hosts that I was happy to discuss the risks of Internet voting, but I would not comment on internal Estonian politics. When asked whether or not I thought the national election was rigged, I refused to comment, aside from saying that no one could prove that it was or was not rigged, because there is no way to conduct a recount of an Internet election.

The Internet portion of the 2011 election lasted from February 24 to March 2, with paper balloting conducted on March 6. The Internet vote was counted the evening of March 6. Estonian law allows complaints to be submitted only during the 3 days immediately following the procedure being challenged. Since Internet voting is considered separate from paper voting, the final day for submitting complaints about Internet voting was March 5. Graduate student Paavo Pihelgas was the only person who submitted a complaint by the deadline. (The Centre Party and independent candidates tried to file complaints, but they did not do so within the required 72 hour time frame).

Pihelgas asked the National Election Commission (NEC) to cancel the election results, since the possibility of election-rigging malware meant that there was no way to be sure that the voters' preferences had been correctly recorded. NEC rejected his complaint the following day, saying that they have all the necessary provisions to detect such cases, without specifying what those provisions are. When Pihelgas resubmitted his complaint, it was forwarded to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint on March 21, say that the voter can file a complaint only when his/her rights have been breached.

I have communicated with several Estonians before, during, and after my trip. I have also read a report written by a team from the OSCE/ODIHR (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights) who observed the March 2011 election, and I have talked with a member of the OSCE/ODIHR team. Based on the information I have obtained, I have concluded that the Internet voting system used in Estonia is insecure.]]></description>
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		<item>
		<title>Let the MOVE Act have a chance to work before considering electronic return of ballots</title>
		<link>http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/2011/08/07/1422</link>
		<comments>http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/2011/08/07/1422#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sun, 07 Aug 2011 17:57:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Dan McCrea</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Overseas and Military Voters]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/?p=1422</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Military and overseas voters saw improvements in their ability to vote in 2010, thanks to the Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment Act (MOVE) passed in late 2009, according to a report to Congress last month by the Military Postal Service Agency (MPSA). The report indicates that MOVE will improve things further as its provisions become better known and implemented.

The MOVE Act required states to send ballots to military and overseas voters at least 45 days before election-day in federal elections so they have time to return their voted ballot. MPSA must pick up ballots for return to election offices no later than 7 days before election day. MOVE also sped up the process by requiring states to offer electronic transmission (website, email, fax) of blank ballots and registration materials. The law stopped short of establishing electronic return of voted ballots because ballots cannot be secured against undetected interception and manipulation over the internet. New procedures were implemented for 2010, coordinating MPSA with USPS, including the use of Express Military Mail Service (EMMS) for uniformed overseas service members and their families.]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
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		<item>
		<title>Voting machine problems in Mississippi primary highlight national concern</title>
		<link>http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/2011/08/04/1397</link>
		<comments>http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/2011/08/04/1397#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 04 Aug 2011 22:42:17 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Verified Voting</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[National]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/?p=1397</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[In the August 3 primary in Mississippi voters experienced voting machine problems: candidates&#8217; names and entire contests missing from the voting machine screens and equipment failing to booting up properly. Problems were reported in Hinds County, which uses the Advanced Voting Systems Winvote and in several counties that use the Premier  (Diebold) TSx equipped with [...]]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>1</slash:comments>
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		<item>
		<title>Email Voting: A National Security Threat in Government Elections</title>
		<link>http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/2011/06/20/1375</link>
		<comments>http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/2011/06/20/1375#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 20 Jun 2011 16:08:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Verified Voting</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Internet Voting]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/?p=1375</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I am very concerned about the widespread push toward Internet voting in the U.S., of which email voting is just one kind.  Neither the Internet itself, nor voters&#8217; computers, nor the email vote collection servers are secure against any of a hundred different cyber attacks that might be launched by anyone in the world from [...]]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>1</slash:comments>
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		<item>
		<title>Philip Stark: Report on second risk-limiting audit under AB 2023 in Monterey County California</title>
		<link>http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/2011/05/07/1370</link>
		<comments>http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/2011/05/07/1370#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sat, 07 May 2011 16:21:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Verified Voting</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Post Election Audits]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/?p=1370</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The second risk-limiting audit under California AB 2023 was conducted on May 6 in Monterey County. The contest was a Special all-mail election for Monterey Peninsula Water Management District Director, Division 1.  Monterey uses Sequoia equipment. There were two candidates: Brenda Lewis and Thomas M. Mancini, and write-ins. 2111 ballots were cast in all.  The reported totals were 1353 reported for [...]]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
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		<title>Online voting is risky and expensive</title>
		<link>http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/2011/04/29/1368</link>
		<comments>http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/2011/04/29/1368#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 29 Apr 2011 19:36:44 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Verified Voting</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Internet Voting]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/?p=1368</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[This article was posted at the CT Mirror and is cross-posted here with permission. Online voting is an appealing option to speed voting for military and overseas voters. Yet it is actually &#8220;Democracy Theater&#8221;, providing an expensive, risky illusion of supporting our troops. Technologists warn of the unsolved technical challenges, while experience shows that the [...]]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
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		<item>
		<title>Oak Ridge, spear phishing, and i-voting</title>
		<link>http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/2011/04/25/1359</link>
		<comments>http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/2011/04/25/1359#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 25 Apr 2011 07:11:39 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Verified Voting</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Internet Voting]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/?p=1359</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Oak Ridge National Labs (one of the US national energy labs, along with Sandia, Livermore, Los Alamos, etc) had a bunch of people fall for a spear phishing attack (see articles in Computerworld and many other descriptions). For those not familiar with the term, spear phishing is sending targeted emails at specific recipients, designed to [...]]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
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		<item>
		<title>Flawed Wisconsin Race Proves Need for Transparency, Accountability in Election Procedures</title>
		<link>http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/2011/04/17/1356</link>
		<comments>http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/2011/04/17/1356#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sun, 17 Apr 2011 12:14:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Verified Voting</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[State]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/?p=1356</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[This overview of the Wisconsin situation was posted at SaveOurVotes.org and is reposted here with permission of the author. When Wisconsin voters flocked to the polls on April 5, one of the factors driving the high turnout was the State Supreme Court contest between incumbent Justice David Prosser and challenger JoAnne Kloppenburg. Prosser, whose term [...]]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
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		<item>
		<title>Losing Democracy in Cyberspace</title>
		<link>http://www.northjersey.com/news/opinions/119137124_Losing_democracy_in_cyberspace.html</link>
		<comments>http://www.northjersey.com/news/opinions/119137124_Losing_democracy_in_cyberspace.html#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 Apr 2011 06:28:22 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Verified Voting</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Internet Voting]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/?p=1340</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[This op-ed appeared at Northjersey.com on April 3, 2011. Penny M. Venetis is a professor at Rutgers School of Law. She specializes in constitutional law, election law and human rights law. Voting computers, like heads of state, must be held accountable to the people they serve. It has been nothing short of astonishing that, within [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://www.northjersey.com/news/opinions/119137124_Losing_democracy_in_cyberspace.html/feed</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>New York Times: The Asymmetrical Online War</title>
		<link>http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/2011/04/03/1336</link>
		<comments>http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/2011/04/03/1336#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 04 Apr 2011 03:46:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Verified Voting</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Internet Voting]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/?p=1336</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[This editorial appeared in the New York Times on April 3, 2011. In 1975, John Brunner wrote a science fiction novel, “The Shockwave Rider,” about a lone programmer who creates a computer worm that exposes a repressive regime’s secrets and ultimately undermines a tyrannical government. Life invariably seems to find a way to imitate art, [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/2011/04/03/1336/feed</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Disappointing Reversal on Transparency and Security for Washington Elections</title>
		<link>http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/2011/03/07/1333</link>
		<comments>http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/2011/03/07/1333#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 08 Mar 2011 01:06:17 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Verified Voting</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Internet Voting]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/?p=1333</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[A bill aimed at reducing restriction to voting for military and other overseas voters passed the Washington State Senate by a 47-1 vote on Friday.  Senate Bill 5171 contains many provisions that will certainly make voting easier for Washington citizens living overseas including moving the primary election date two weeks earlier and meeting requirements of [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/2011/03/07/1333/feed</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Give Us The Ballot</title>
		<link>http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/2011/01/17/1319</link>
		<comments>http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/2011/01/17/1319#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 17 Jan 2011 17:17:40 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Verified Voting</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Voting Rights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Brown vs. Board of Education]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Martin Luther King]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/?p=1319</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The following passage is excerpted from a speech that Dr. King delivered  on the steps of  the Lincoln Memorial at the Prayer Pilgrimage for Freedom May 17, 1957 marking the third anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education and eight years before the enactment of the Voting Rights Act. Three years ago the Supreme Court [...]]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
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